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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1954 
_____________ 
 
GIVI TERENTIEV, 
        Petitioner 
v.  
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Board No. A213-090-789) 
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 30, 2019 
_____________ 
 
Before: RESTREPO, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 11, 2019) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
* This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.  
 
Petitioner Givi Terentiev, a Georgian citizen, seeks review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) final 
order of removal and dismissal of his withholding of removal under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  Terentiev argues that the BIA erred in 
mischaracterizing the Immigration Court record.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Terentiev identifies as ethnically Russian.  In 2008, military conflict broke out 
between Russia and Georgia.  As a result, Terentiev claims that Georgian attitudes 
towards Russians changed, making him the target of several criminal incidents in Georgia 
starting in 2009.  He also claims the police became less responsive to crimes targeting his 
business. 
First, one of Terentiev’s businesses was set on fire.  Terentiev submitted a report 
and written complaint to the police but they did not investigate.  Second, a pipe bomb 
was placed in the same business.  The police removed the pipe bomb but took no further 
action. Third, Terentiev was the victim of an armed robbery.  The police reportedly “did 
nothing.”  Pet. Br. 16.  Fourth, Terentiev and his family were reportedly the target of 
many verbal and physical attacks by their neighbors.  These incidents included cursing, 
threats, and having eggs, a brick, and “Molotov cocktail” explosives thrown at his house.  
Terentiev reported these incidents to the police and fire department, but no investigation 
followed.  
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On March 9, 2016, after multiple attempts to emigrate from Georgia, Terentiev 
entered the United States and overstayed his tourist visa.  Terentiev was subsequently 
arrested for a driving violation, at which time he did not possess valid immigration 
documents.  He was placed in removal proceedings in accordance with 8 U.S.C. 
§1227(a)(1)(B) and summoned to appear before the York Immigration Court.  At his first 
hearing, Terentiev filed an I-589 form requesting asylum, statutory withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  His request was 
amended to include allegations of persecution based on political opinion and membership 
in a particular social group.  
The IJ denied Terentiev’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under CAT on the ground that his allegations did not rise to the level of 
persecution.  The IJ clarified that Terentiev’s asylum application was untimely and that 
he was ineligible for CAT protection because it was unlikely he would be tortured by the 
Georgian government upon return.  The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.1  Terentiev now 
appeals. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review a final order of removal 
issued by the BIA.  Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007).  The 
BIA’s standard of review for an IJ’s factual findings, such as evidence of persecution, is 
                                                      
1  The BIA determined that Terentiev waived his right to appeal the IJ’s denial of 
his application for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) and his request for CAT 
protection under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).  Terentiev did not raise these 
issues on appeal, so we have no jurisdiction to review these claims. 
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one of clear error.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3).  We review these findings of fact under the 
deferential substantial evidence standard.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
The BIA may review and summarily affirm, or analyze in an independent opinion, 
the decisions of an IJ.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)–(6).  When the BIA adopts an IJ’s 
decision and reasoning, we review both rulings.  See Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 
F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2011).  However, when the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision after only 
relying on parts of the IJ’s reasoning, as here, we only review the grounds relied on.  
Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). 
III. 
To be eligible for withholding of removal, applicants have the burden of proving 
that they will more likely than not face persecution on account of a protected ground—
such as race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion—if returned to their country of origin.  See Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 
(3d Cir. 2003).  Applicants who can show that they suffered past persecution trigger a 
“rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.”2  Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 174 (3d Cir. 2003); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1). 
The IJ correctly concluded that the discrimination, name-calling, and unfulfilled 
threats Terentiev faced did not rise to the level of persecution.  See Sioe Tjen Wong v. 
                                                      
2  This presumption is rebuttable if the IJ finds there has been a fundamental 
change in circumstances that undermines the applicant’s fear of persecution, or if the 
applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to a different part of the country.  
Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 174. 
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Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that incidents of harassment and 
discrimination may only qualify if “sufficiently severe to constitute a pattern or practice 
of persecution”).3  Similarly, the IJ and BIA correctly indicated the lack of a nexus 
between past harm and fears of future harm because Terentiev failed to show that his 
Russian ethnicity was the central motive for his persecution and failed to prove he would 
be singled out for persecution due to his ethnicity.4  See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 
40, 43-44 (BIA 2017); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341 (BIA 2010).  
Additionally, Terentiev’s reliance on the Georgian police’s lack of follow-up to 
his reports does not rise to the level needed for persecution.  Each time Terentiev 
contacted the police, they responded, albeit not in the exact manner he wished.  As the 
BIA indicated, Terentiev had access to the police but did not avail himself to all of the 
protections that were available to him. 
To demonstrate persecution or a likelihood of future persecution, Terentiev had to 
establish that persecution was or will be perpetrated “by the government or its agents,” 
or, “by forces the government is unable or unwilling to control.”  See Valdiviezo-
                                                      
3  The BIA did not address the IJ’s findings as to whether or not the discrimination 
Terentiev faced amounted to “persecution.”  Instead, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision 
on the ground that there was attenuation between any past harm and potential future harm 
faced by Terentiev. 
 
4  The IJ inferred that Terentiev was a “target of generalized crime and robbery,” 
rather than an ethnic target.  The record points to other factors that could have led to 
animosity between Terentiev and his neighbors, such as the likely jealousy that was felt 
by his neighbors over his socioeconomic status and high income for the area.  This point 
is bolstered by facts such as that when Terentiev was robbed, he was not badly injured, 
which is more suggestive of a desire to steal than any persecutory motive. 
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Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 
477 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007)).  The evidence in the record shows that Georgian 
officials repeatedly responded to Terentiev’s home.  We cannot say on this record that the 
evidence compels a finding that Georgian officials are unable or unwilling to protect 
Terentiev from people or groups that may attempt to do him harm. 
Finally, Terentiev’s arguments of personal, rather than general, persecution also 
fail given that his wife and mother who were living with him—neither of whom is 
Russian—were also the subjects of these same incidents.  In fact, Terentiev’s similarly 
situated mother remains in Georgia unharmed.  Therefore, Terentiev is unable to make 
any individualized showing that he would be singled out for persecution. 
Given that the likelihood component of Terentiev’s potential future persecution is 
a factual inquiry and not a legal one, we defer to the BIA unless the evidence compels a 
contrary conclusion.  See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
BIA found no error in the IJ’s finding that Terentiev’s past persecution was not 
attributable to his Russian ethnicity and we agree.  
Terentiev also argues that the IJ improperly limited his testimony.  However, 
having reviewed the record, it is apparent that the IJ’s management of Terentiev’s 
testimony did not result in a “denial of the fundamental fairness” to which Terentiev is 
entitled.  Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 587 (3d Cir. 2005).  We will deny the 
petition for review. 
